UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-10-2013

State v. Barrera Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39564

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Barrera Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39564" (2013). Not Reported. 584.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/584

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA
STATE OF IDAHO,

OPY

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
BENSON BARRERA,
Defendant-Appellant.

_____________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No.39564
Ada Co. Case No.
CR-2011-1797

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE DARLA S. WILLIAMSON
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SPENCER J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ............................................................................. 1
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ................................. 1
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 6
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 7
I.

II.

Ill.

Barrera Has Failed To Show The Evidence Was Not
Sufficient To Support His Conviction For Aggravated
Assault ....................................................................................... 7
A.

Introduction ..................................................................... 7

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................ 7

C.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To
Prove The Essential Elements Of Aggravated Assault ... 8

Barrera Has Failed To Establish The Court Committed
Instructional Error When It Responded To The Jury's
Question Regarding The Requisite Mental State For
Aggravated Assault.. ................................................................ 12
A.

Introduction ................................................................... 12

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 12

C.

Because Barrera Consented To The Court's
Response To The Jury's Question, His Claim
Of Error In Relation To That Response Is
Precluded By The Invited Error Doctrine ....................... 12

Barrera Has Failed To Establish Error In The Admission
Of Two Of His Text Messages ................................................. 17
A.

Introduction ................................................................... 17

IV.

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 18

C.

Barrera's "You Blow" and "Want to fuck?"
Text Messages Were Properly Admitted ...................... 18

Barrera Has Failed To Establish The District Court
Abused Its Discretion In Excluding His Expert Testimony
On Head-Butting ...................................................................... 26
A.

Introduction ................................................................... 26

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 26

C.

Barrera Has Failed To Show Error In The
Exclusion Of His Head-Butting Expert .......................... 27

V.

Cumulative Error ...................................................................... 31

VI.

Barrera Has Failed To Establish The Prosecutor
Committed Misconduct In Closing Argument, Much
Less That The Prosecutor's Rebuttal Argument
Amounted To Fundamental Error ............................................ 31
A.

Introduction ................................................................... 31

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 32

C.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct
During Closing Argument.. ............................................ 32

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 37
APPENDIX A

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

CASES

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) ................................................. 35, 36
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) ................................................... 30
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) ................................................................ 36
State

v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816,864 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1993) ....................... 15

State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577,759 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1988) ................. 13, 17
State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713,264 P.3d 54 (2011) .......................................... 30
State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 706 P.2d 456 (1985) ........................................ 15
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 261 P.3d 853 (2011) ........................................ 31
State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759,735 P.2d 1070 (Ct. App. 1987) .......................... 7, 8
State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 527,129 P.3d 1276 (Ct. App. 2006) ........................ 18
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998) .......................... 31
State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 264 P.3d 75 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................ 18, 26
State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 216 P.3d 1291 (Ct. App. 2009) ........................... 18
State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 946 P.2d 1338 (Ct. App. 1997) ......................... 8
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991) .......................... 8
State

v.

Lee, 131 Idaho 600,961 P.2d 1203 (Ct. App. 1998) ............................. 15

State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009) ..................................... 30
State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 11 P.3d 494 (Ct. App. 2000) ............................ 16
State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,254 P.3d 77 (Ct. App. 2011) ............................ 15
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 967 (2010) ......................... 17, 31, 32, 36
State

v.

Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992) ............................. 7

iii

State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 816 P.2d 1002 (Ct. App. 1991) .................... 36
State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 248 P.3d 720 (2010) ............................................ 19
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,215 P.3d 414 (2009) .............................. 12, 35
State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 285 P.3d 348 (Ct. App. 2012) ............ 23, 24, 25
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ......................................... 24
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) .......................................................... 23
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) ......................................................... 36

RULES
I.R.E. 401 ............................................................................................................ 18
I.R.E. 402 ............................................................................................................ 18
I.R.E. 403 ...................................................................................................... 19, 24
I.R.E. 404(a)(1) .............................................................................................22, 23

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Benson Barrera appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict
finding him guilty of aggravated assault.

Barrera claims there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction, instructional error, evidentiary error, and
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Starting in January 2010, Barrera had an affair with Juan "Carlos"
Ramirez' wife, Scarlet. (Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.4-12.) Shortly after the affair began,
Scarlet told Carlos about the affair and asked him for a divorce. (Trial Tr., p.216,
L.20 - p.218, L.1.) During divorce proceedings, Carlos called Barrera and asked
him to "please back off' until the divorce was final.

(Trial Tr., p.373, L.18 -

p.374, L.8.)
A few months later, Carlos encountered Barrera in a restaurant
downtown.

(Trial Tr., p.375, Ls.9-14.)

Barrera initially gave Carlos a phony

name, but Carlos figured out who Barrera was and asked him to go outside and
talk.

(Trial Tr., p.377, L.18 - p.380, L.2.)

Carlos testified that, during that

conversation, Barrera "was gloating, letting [him] know that he had been with
better looking women; that [Scarlet] was nothing, just another notch in his belt."
(Trial Tr., p.380, Ls.3-5.) One of Barrera's friends joined the conversation and
asked what was going on and Barrera introduced him as his friend, Scott, "a
captain in the armed forces." (Trial Tr., p.381, Ls.7-16.) One of Carlos' friends
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then came up, followed by the group he was with, and the conversation ended.
(Trial Tr., p.381, Ls.19-22.)
A few weeks later, Carlos ran into Barrera again. (Trial Tr., p.382, Ls.5-7.)
Barrera "bumped into" Carlos and said, "Hey, Buddy." (Trial Tr., p.382, Ls.1011.) Carlos' friend advised Barrera, "He's not your buddy.

Don't talk to him.

Leave him alone. Back off," and Barrera left. (Trial Tr., p.382, Ls.14-21.)
Several months later, on January 15, 2011, Barrera was at Grainey's bar
downtown with his brother, Armando, his friend Jeremy McGinnis, Margery
Jacobsen, a girl he was dating, and Margery's friend, Megan Nelson. (Trial Tr.,
p.663, Ls.9-11, p.666, Ls.8-9, p.305, L.24 - p.307, L.12.) Carlos was also at
Grainey's at some point that same night but only stayed for approximately 30
minutes.

(Trial Tr., p.364, L.22, p.365, L.18 - p.366, L.11.) Although Carlos

denied seeing Barrera at Grainey's, Barrera testified that he passed Carlos on
his way to the bathroom and Carlos said, "Fucking pussy," as Barrera walked by.
(Trial Tr., p.369, Ls.10-16, p.436, Ls.11-17, p.671, L.4 - p.672, L.7.) Barrera
claimed the comment "bugged" him, but he did not respond and returned to his
friends. (Trial Tr., p.672, Ls.8-19.)
Rather than complain to his friends about the encounter, Barrera sent a
text message to Scarlet even though their affair ended approximately six months
prior. (Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.13-19, p.672, Ls.22-24.) The text message read, "I
saw your pussy ass ex. He tried to get brave but i'm here with two big dudes."
(Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.7-14; Exhibit 6 (capitalization original).) The message was
dated 1/16/11 and time stamped 12:22 a.m. (Exhibit 6.) Scarlet responded with
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"something like, stop it. I'm serious." (Trial Tr., p.225, Ls.2-5.) At 12:25 a.m.,
Barrera wrote back: "So am i. He's little. We're huge. Don't get brave little
guy[.]" (Trial Tr., p.225, Ls.8-14; Exhibit 7 (capitalization original).) Scarlet then
said something to the sort of, do me a favor and drop this. He
didn't do anything to you. Why do you have a problem with him?
We had an affair when we were still married. You know, you
shouldn't have a problem with him. He should have a problem with
you. Just leave him alone.
(Trial Tr., p.225, L.20 - p.226, L.1.) At 12:47 a.m., Barrera responded, "You and
him are gay and small."

(Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.2-8; Exhibit 8.)

Scarlet asked

Barrera if that made him feel "happy" to say that, and Barrera answered, "Bliss."
(Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.8-12, p.240, Ls.14-21; Exhibit 9.)
At 1:22 a.m., 32 minutes after Barrera sent Scarlet the text message that
said, "Bliss," he sent her another text that said, "You blow[.]" (Trial Tr., p.737,
Ls.3-16; Exhibit 10.) The "You blow" message was not sent in response to any
message from Scarlet.

(Id.) Fifteen minutes later, at 1:37 a.m., Barrera sent

Scarlet another unsolicited message asking, "Want to fuck?" (Trial Tr., p.737,
L.23-p.16; Exhibit 11.)
Barrera and his companions left Grainey's shortly before 2:00 a.m. and
headed to Jimmy John's then Chronic Tacos to get something to eat. (Trial Tr.,
p.673, L.19 - p.674, L.9.) While the group was sitting in Chronic Tacos, Carlos
came in with his friend, Robert Sanchez, and Robert's cousin's friend, Greg.
(Trial Tr., p.384, L.17 - p.386, L.11, p.489, Ls.5-20.) Although there are differing
accounts of what exactly transpired at Chronic Tacos, all the witnesses generally
agreed that Carlos and Barrera exchanged words about Barrera's involvement in
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breaking up Carlos' marriage to Scarlet, yelling to the point where one of the
Chronic Tacos employees threatened to call the police.

(See generally Tr.,

pp.297-299, 311-313, 386-388, 488-492, 558-566, 587-591, 637-641.) Shortly
thereafter, Carlos left as did Barrera. 1 (Trial Tr., p.394, L.23 - p.397, L.4, p.683,
Ls.15-19.)
As Carlos and his friends were walking back to Carlos' car, they again
encountered Barrera and his friends and, again, there are differing accounts of
what happened next. (Trial Tr., p.397, L.2 - p.400, L.14; see generally pp.400404, 496-99, 574-579, 593-597, 692-697.) Carlos testified that Barrera taunted
him, saying, "She liked it." (Trial Tr., p.400, Ls.18-20.) Carlos said he responded
by making a comment about Barrera's failed baseball career, and Barrera
reacted by taking his coat off, grabbing Carlos' shirt, then grabbing him by the
neck and head-butting him, causing a deep laceration above Carlos' eye. (Trial
Tr., p.401, Ls.3-15; Exhibits 2-5.) The others separated the two and, after a
passerby indicated an intent to call the police, everyone "walked away." (Trial
Tr., p.597, L.2 - p.599, L.10.)
Carlos did not initially seek medical attention or the assistance of law
enforcement, but went to the emergency room several hours later after becoming
concerned about the nature of his head wound.
p.416,L.5.)

(Trial Tr., p.415, L.12 -

Hospital personnel notified police and Officer Matthew Canfield

Barrera's date and her friend left after Barrera told Carlos, "me and my buddy
tag-teamed your ex-wife." (Trial Tr., p.297, Ls.20-25, p.300, Ls.1-7.)
1
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responded and interviewed Carlos.

(Trial Tr., p.195, L.9-p.196, L.7, p.416,

Ls.13-16.)
The state originally charged Barrera with aggravated battery but later
amended the charge to aggravated assault. (R., pp.67-68, 156-161, 211-212.)
The case proceeded to trial after which a jury found Barrera guilty of the charged
offense.

(R., p.308.)

The court granted Barrera's request for a withheld

judgment and placed him on probation for five years. (R., pp.312-313, 316-317,
320-321, 336-337.) Barrera filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.322-325.)
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ISSUES
Barrera states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was the evidence presented sufficient to establish Mr.
Barrera's guilt on the charge of aggravated assault?

2.

Did the district court err when it improperly instructed the jury
as to the requisite mental state for aggravated assault?

3.

Did the district court err when it admitted to irrelevant and
prejudicial text messages over Mr. Barrera's objection?

4.

Did the district court when it excluded, on relevance
grounds, a defense expert on head-butting?

5.

Is Mr. Barrera entitled to a new trial under the cumulative
error doctrine?

6.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, constituting a
fundamental error in violation of Mr. Barrera's due process
right to a fair trial, when she insulted the function of defense
counsel during closing arguments?

(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the state present sufficient evidence from which the jury could
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Barrera was guilty of aggravated
assault?
2.
Does Barrera's claim of instructional error fail because it was invited and
otherwise not preserved?
3.
Has Barrera failed to show reversible error in the admission of the text
messages he wrote to Scarlett just prior to his assault on Carlos?
4.
Has Barrera failed to show reversible error in the exclusion of his
proffered expert on head-butting?
5.
Because Barrera has failed to show any error, is the cumulative error
doctrine inapplicable?
6.
Has Barrera failed to show the prosecutor's comments during rebuttal
closing were error much less fundamental error entitling him to a new trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Barrera Has Failed To Show The Evidence Was Not Sufficient To Support His
Conviction For Aggravated Assault
A.

Introduction
Barrera challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction for aggravated assault. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11.) Specifically, he
contends the state failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that "the head-butt purportedly executed by
[him] constituted 'a means likely to produce great bodily harm."'

(Appellant's

Brief, p.10.) Barrera further argues, "At most, the evidence established a simple
assault and / or battery" and asks this Court to vacate his withheld judgment,
"order that a judgment of conviction be entered on the charge, and remand this
matter to the district court for the State to elect whether to pursue the lesserincluded charges of simple assault and/ or battery." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8, 11.)
Barrera's argument fails. A review of the evidence presented shows the
state presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could find Barrera
committed an aggravated assault on Carlos Ramirez. Barrera has failed to show
he is entitled to an acquittal on the charged offense.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered

upon a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
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Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121
Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735
P.2d at 1072.

C.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove The Essential
Elements Of Aggravated Assault
In order for the jury to find Barrera guilty of aggravated assault, the state

was required to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

On or about January 16, 2011,

2.

in the state of Idaho,

3.

the defendant Benson Barrera unlawfully attempted, with
apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of
Juan Carlos Ramirez,

4.

by head-butting the victim, and

5.

the defendant committed that assault by a means or force
likely to produce great bodily harm.

(R., p.292.)
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Barrera challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the last element,
which required the state to prove he committed the assault "by a means or force
likely to produce great bodily harm." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) The record shows
otherwise.
Barrera concedes, as he must, that Dr. Randy Barnes, who treated Carlos
for the wound inflicted by Barrera, testified that "the significance of the [headbutting] mechanism does potentially lend itself to some significant injury." (Trial
Tr., p.274, Ls.14-16.) Dr. Barnes elaborated:
It may seem counterintuitive to a layperson, but often the
external findings aren't particularly of as much concern to me on
the initial evaluation due to a fixed skull with a relatively soft brain
inside, often it's the force that's applied on that that can cause that
brain to shift, and so sometimes, the more serious injuries may not
be readily visible from just, you know, an external skin exam, if you
will, but those types of injuries can lead to hemorrhaging
contusions, which is essentially bruising on the brain. Depending
on the force that's involved, arteries can be torn causing, what, we
call, an epidural hematoma, which is essentially a life-threatening
illness. Somebody may look quite well for a few minutes, talking,
and then suddenly drop dead. And then also some subdural
hemorrhaging, just different parts of the vascular system within the
brain that can be injured with that kind of sheer mechanism, so the
force that's applied, causing the brain to shift in some degree, can
lend itself to deeper injuries that are readily obvious at the surface.
(Trial Tr., p.274, L.19 - p.275, L.14.)
Dr. Barnes further testified that, in his practice as an emergency room
physician, he has seen patients who have suffered epidural hematomas as a
result of being head-butted, which "required emergent evacuation from [a]
neurosurgeon in the operating room." (Trial Tr., p.278, Ls.1-8.) When asked
how dangerous a head-butt can be, Dr. Barnes responded, "With the right force
applied, it can be life-threatening." (Trial Tr., p.278, Ls.20-22.) And, when asked

9

whether "a head-butt [is] the kind of mechanism that is likely to cause great
bodily harm, Dr. Barnes testified, "Absolutely." (Trial Tr., p.278, Ls.23-25.)
In claiming that Dr. Barnes' testimony was insufficient evidence that
Barrera's act of head-butting Carlos was committed by a means or force likely to
produce great bodily harm, Barrera relies, in part, on Dr. Barnes' testimony on
redirect, that '"[w]ithout seeing the mechanism of the injury, it's challenging to
know' whether [Carlos] experienced a significant, direct blunt force." (Appellant's
Brief, pp.9-10 (quoting Trial Tr., p.293, Ls.11-17).)

In context, Dr. Barnes'

testimony on this point was as follows:
Q: And, Doctor, [defense counsel] said to you that, he, meaning
Carlos, had nothing that attended a significant direct blunt force.
And you said, no. I'm just curious. Can you know then that Carlos
didn't experience a significant direct blunt force?

A:

Correct.
Without seeing the mechanism of injury, it's
challenging to know.

Q: Okay. So I guess where I'm going with this is, is it possible that
you get hit in the head super hard but you're still okay?

A: Correct.
Q: Okay. You have the risk of all the things you've described.

A: Absolutely, as we talked about that. It's the deceleration injury.
The skull is fixed and the brain soft inside, does shift with that
impact, depending on where something may or may not give.
That's the mechanism for the more significant injury.
Q: If there are such factors, what makes one person okay and
another person not okay, receiving the same type of blow? Are
there such factors? Thickness of skull or anything?

A: Certainly we all have some anatomical differences that may
make you predisposed to a certain thing. Again, it's the direction
and the amount of force that's applied on that certainly is important.
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Q: So you might just get lucky.
A: That's correct.

(Trial Tr., p.293, L.11 - p.294, L.13.)
Thus, Dr. Barnes' confirmed that the absence of any neurologic or other
serious injury did not mean Carlos did not experience a "significant direct blunt
force." Regardless, that neither Dr. Barnes nor any other witness could measure
the amount of force Barrera applied when he head-butted Carlos, does not mean
the state failed to prove the final element of aggravated assault because that
element does not require proof of such.

The element can be proven by

demonstrating that Barrera committed the assault by "a means or force likely to
produce great bodily harm."

(R., p.292 (emphasis added).)

Dr. Barnes'

testimony that a head-butt is "absolutely" a mechanism, i.e., a means, likely to
cause great bodily harm was evidence from which the jury could conclude the
state met its burden of proof on the final element of aggravated assault.
The evidence that Barrera "planned to execute any such head-butt
carefully enough not to cause the type of injury that would constitute a felony" 2
does not, as Barrera claims, change the sufficiency of the evidence on this point.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.)

Even assuming Barrera intended to avoid

producing great bodily harm, this does not mean the mechanism he used to

The state presented evidence that Barrera told a prior girlfriend "if some dude
ever got brave with him that he would just head-butt him, and he said that they
would never see it coming, and you can't defend against it." (Trial Tr., p.756,
Ls.16-20.) Barrera also told her, "he would just have to be careful that he didn't
break the guy's jaw or anything because he didn't want it to be a felony. He was
fine with a misdemeanor, but he didn't want a felony." (Trial Tr., p.756, L.23 p.757, L.1.)
2
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assault Carlos was not a means of doing so.

Barrera's claim otherwise lacks

merit.
Barrera has failed to meet his burden of establishing the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of aggravated assault.

11.
Barrera Has Failed To Establish The Court Committed Instructional Error When
It Responded To The Jury's Question Regarding The Requisite Mental State For
Aggravated Assault
A.

Introduction
Barrera "asserts the district court erred when it improperly instructed the

jury as to the requisite mental state for aggravated assault in response to a jury
question." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) According to Barrera, "the district court's
answer to the jury's question lessened the State's burden of proof and violated
[his] Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Any claim of
error related to the response otherwise fails under the invited error doctrine.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this

Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d
414, 430 (2009).

C.

Because Barrera Consented To The Court's Response To The Jury's
Question, His Claim Of Error In Relation To That Response Is Precluded
By The Invited Error Doctrine
During deliberations, the jury asked, "Regarding Instruction No. 11: To

prove aggravated assault, does the state need to show that the defendant
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intended to commit an assault likely to produce great bodily harm?

In other

words, does the defendant's intent apply to the phrase, 'likely to produce great
bodily harm?"' (Juror Question to Judge During Deliberation 3; 10/19/2011 Tr.,
p.91, Ls.6-12.) The court noted there was a "lively discussion with counsel" off
the record "on what the court should instruct." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.91, Ls.16-18.)
Following that off-the-record discussion, the court, citing State v. Bonaparte, 114
Idaho 577, 759 P.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1988), concluded it would respond to the jury's
question as follows: "The criminal intent which is required is the general intent to
willfully commit an act, the direct, natural and probable consequences of which if
successfully completed would be the injury to another. The intent to cause any
particular injury is not necessary." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.93, Ls.1-6; Augmentation.)
Barrera objected stating his belief that "the words 'violent injury' should be
in there in this case." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.93, Ls.16-17.) Absent his requested
modification, Barrera asked the court to "consider just telling [the jury] that we
have instructed fully on the law and sending them back to a careful and concise
reading of the instructions previously given."

(10/19/2011 Tr., p.97, Ls.4-7.)

Barrera argued: "To the extent that [the proposed answer] will be found in effect
another jury instruction, it entirely diminishes the requirements that you've
already given them about violent injury and a means or force likely to produce
great bodily harm." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.97, Ls.9-13.) The prosecutor suggested

3

The Juror Question to Judge During Deliberation was augmented to the record
pursuant to Barrera's motion and is attached hereto as Appendix A. (Motion to
Augment the Record and Statement in Support Thereof, filed January 10, 2013;
Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record, dated January 15, 2013.)
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that, to alleviate Barrera's concerns, the court could advise the jury to read the
instructions as a whole, as they are required to do. (10/19/2011 Tr., p.95, Ls.1922, p.96, Ls.19-21, p.100, Ls.8-10.) Barrera persisted, claiming the jury would
not "look at the old instructions" but would just "take this new one and if it doesn't
refer to an injury that's violent, if it doesn't refer to great bodily harm, if it just has
the word 'injury' or just has the word 'harm,"' the instruction "in essence" tells
them "to convict." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.99, Ls.18-23.) The court said it was willing
to accommodate Barrera and asked, "what did you want?"

(10/19/2011 Tr.,

p.100, Ls.11-15.) Defense counsel responded: "The state still must prove and
make the reference to violent injury or make the reference to great bodily harm."
(10/19/2011 Tr., p.17-19.)

Based on this, the court suggested the following

addition to its proposed answer, "It is for you to decide if there was an assault
and if it was done by any means or force likely to produce great bodily harm,"
and asked Barrera if that was "acceptable." (10/19/2011 Tr., p.9-12.) Barrera
suggested modifying the language to say "a means," rather than "any means,"
which the court did. (Augmentation.)
Barrera argues that although the district court's instructions were
otherwise correct, 4 the court's "response to the jury question modified the

4

Barrera devotes a portion of his instructional error argument to highlighting the
district court's rejection of his request to insert the word "intentionally" before the
word "unlawfully" in Instruction Nos. 3, 11, and 12, and he suggests that the law
discussing the intent necessary may be incorrect or require clarification.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12, 14-15 and n.12.)
Nevertheless, he appears to
ultimately concede the court's instructions regarding the elements of aggravated
assault were correct and only claims the response to the jury question was
erroneous. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) As such, this is the only instructional error
claim the state will address.
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instruction to remove the requisite mental state, thereby lightening the State's
burden of proof in violation of [his] Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."
(Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Barrera's instructional error claims fails for one of two
reasons: it is either not preserved or any error was invited.
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an
error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error." State v.
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187, 254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v.
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993)). "One may
not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in."

Norton, 151

Idaho at 187, 254 P.3d at 88 (citing State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706
P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208
(Ct. App. 1998)).
Barrera claims he "objected to answering the jury's question." (Appellant's
Brief, p.13.)

This is only partly true.

Barrera only objected to answering the

jury's question if the court did not intend to include the words "violent injury" in its
response.

The court, however, ultimately modified its response to address

Barrera's concern that the response would "lose" the requirements of "violent
injury" and "great bodily harm" expressed in the elements instruction (Instruction
No. 11 (R., p.292)). (10/19/2011 Tr., p.95, L.23-p.96, L.1; p.98, Ls.4-10, p.100,
L.11 - p.101, L.18.) Barrera cannot now complain about the very response he
consented to or acquiesced in.
Barrera's other argument in relation to the court's response to the jury
question seems to be premised on a different objection than the one made
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below. The jury's question related to whether the intent requirement applied to
the great bodily harm element of aggravated assault. (Appendix A.) The court's
response correctly answered that question.

Barrera's only concern about the

court's response, as originally proposed, was that it did not include the word
"violent" before injury, which is the element to which the intent requirement
applied.

Because the jury's question related to the intent, if any, required in

relation to the "great bodily harm" element, the court properly rejected Barrera's
request to modify its use of the word "injury" with the word "violent," which would
have created additional confusion between the third and fifth elements of
aggravated assault. The court, however, addressed Barrera's concern that the
jury would ignore the elements instruction, as he was afraid they might, by
reiterating that it was for the jury to decide whether there was an assault
committed by a means or force likely to produce great bodily harm. (Appendix
A.)

On appeal, Barrera's objection to the response is based on an assertion
that the response "improperly informed the jury that it could convict [him] in the
absence of any intent to cause injury." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This claim is
different than the concern raised by defense counsel. As such, this Court should
decline to consider it. State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 879, 11 P.3d 494, 498
(Ct. App. 2000) (noting general rule that claims will not be considered for the first
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time on appeal\

Even if the claim was preserved, Barrera's argument

ultimately boils down to an assertion that the response allowed the jury to convict
without proof of specific intent.

However, the state had no such burden.

Bonaparte, 114 Idaho at 580, 759 P.2d at 86. Barrera's claim to the contrary
lacks merit.

111.
Barrera Has Failed To Establish Error In The Admission Of Two Of His Text
Messages
A.

Introd uctio n
Barrera asserts "the district court erred when it admitted two text

messages that he sent to [Scarlet], shortly before the altercation with [Carlos],"
claiming the messages "were irrelevant" and, even assuming "minimal[ ]"
relevance, "they were unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 and constituted
impermissible character evidence in violation of Rule 404." (Appellant's Brief,
pp.15-16.) Barrera is incorrect. The district court correctly concluded Barrera's
"You blow" and "Want to fuck?" text messages to Scarlet were relevant,
admissible for purposes other than character, and were not unfairly prejudicial.
(Trial Tr., p.734, L.6 - p.735, L.25.)

Even if the district court erred in its

evidentiary ruling, any error is harmless.

5

The exception to this rule is that Idaho appellate courts will review fundamental
errors that clearly violate a defendant's constitution rights. State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 967, 976 (2010). Barrera has not asserted, much less
established, the court's response to the jury's question resulted in fundamental
error that may be considered for the first time on appeal. (See generally
Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15.)
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B.

Standard Of Review
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the

province of the trial court." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted).

"[A] trial court's determination as to the

admission of evidence at trial will only be reversed where there has been an
abuse of that discretion."

&

When the appellate court reviews an evidentiary ruling for abuse of
discretion, it conducts "a multi-tiered inquiry, examining 1) whether the lower
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the court acted
within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 921, 216 P.3d
1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted).

C.

Barrera's "You Blow" and "Want to fuck?" Text Messages Were Properly
Admitted
"Relevant evidence is generally

admissible." State v. Harvey, 142

Idaho 527, 532, 129 P.3d 1276, 1281 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing I.RE. 402).
"Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Harvey, 142 Idaho at
532, 129 P.3d at 1281 (citing I.RE. 401 ). "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
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prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010) (quoting I.RE.
403).

"To exclude evidence under Rule 403, the trial court must address

whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by one of the
considerations listed in the Rule." Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 722. This
balancing test is committed to the discretion of the trial judge.

kl

At trial, the state sought to admit a series of text messages Barrera sent to
Scarlett within hours of Barrera assaulting Carlos. 6 Those text messages, which
were ultimately admitted as Exhibits 6 through 11, read:
•

Exhibit 6, sent 1/16/11 at 12:22 a.m.: "I saw your pussy ass ex. He
tried to get brave but I'm here with two big dudes." (Capitalization
original.)

•

Exhibit 7, sent 1/16/11 at 12:25 a.m.: "So am i. He's little. We're
huge. Don't get brave little guy[.]" (Capitalization original.)

6

On appeal, Barrera contends, "The State sought to introduce what it classified
as 404(b) evidence consisting of text messages sent by Mr. Barrera to [Scarlet]
Ramirez in the hours preceding the incident in this case." (Appellant's Brief, p.16
(citing R., pp.105-108).) The state does not agree with Barrera's interpretation of
the state's 404(b) motion. While the text messages at issue on appeal were
referenced in the "Background" section of the state's 404(b) motion, the text
messages the state sought to admit as 404(b) evidence were unidentified
messages Barrera "previously" sent to Scarlet "on more than one occasion that
he had seen the victim downtown, and that the victim should be afraid of him."
(R., pp.105-108.) The state's acknowledgment at the pretrial hearing on the
motion that it had not identified the texts that were subject to the 404(b) motion
(6/24/2011 Tr., p.9, Ls.10-20) and its later characterization of the texts depicted
in Exhibits 6-11 as part of the res gestae (Trial Tr., p.342, Ls.7-13) supports the
conclusion that the state did not offer the text messages specifically identified in
the "Background" section of its motion as 404(b) evidence.
19

•

Exhibit 8, sent 1/16/11 at 12:47 a.m.: "You and him are gay and
small."

•

Exhibit 9, sent 1/16/11 at 12:50 a.m.: "Bliss"

•

Exhibit 10, sent 1/16/11 at 1:22 a.m.: "You blow"

•

Exhibit 11, sent 1/16/11 at 1:37 a.m.: "Want to fuck?"

Exhibits 6, 7, and 8 were admitted without objection and the court
overruled Barrera's relevance objection to Exhibit 9.
p.232, L.9.)

(Trial Tr., p.226, L.14 -

With respect to the "You blow" (Exhibit 10) and "Want to fuck?"

(Exhibit 11) text messages, Barrera argued those messages "are not probative of
anything in this case."

(Trial Tr., p.227, Ls.9-17.)

The state explained the

messages were relevant because they supported the state's theory of the case
that Barrera is "the alpha male that gets the woman and commits acts of
violence." (Trial Tr., p.229, Ls.4-5; see also p.230, Ls.2-6.) Defense counsel
responded: "This alpha male thing is an attempt to characterize my client as a
violent, nasty, vile, filthy fellow, and it has nothing to do, and has no probative
value, on what happened in the parking lot."

(Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.15-19.)

Defense counsel also referred to the messages as being in the "character zone"
and as "attempted character assassination." (Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.15, 21.)
The court initially sustained Barrera's objections to Exhibits 10 and 11
concluding, "if it is relevant, I think the prejudicial value outweighs the probative
value." (Trial Tr., p.233, Ls.6-9.) The state renewed its request to admit the
Exhibits following Scarlett's testimony.

(Trial Tr., p.337, L.8 - p.338, L.7.)

Barrera again objected, arguing: "a nasty text to the wife has nothing to do with
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aggression toward Carlos, and those two items [Exhibits 10 and 11] have no
reference to him, have no context to him." (Trial Tr., p.339, L.23 - p.340, L.1.)
At that point, the court noted it originally viewed the texts as only showing
Barrera as a "bad person" and "a womanizer," which weighed in favor of
exclusion based on unfair prejudice. (Trial Tr., p.340, L.18-p.341, L.25.) The
court agreed to reconsider its ruling if the state wanted to "bring in some case
law" to support its argument that the evidence was admissible as part of the res
gestae. (Trial Tr., p.342, Ls.7-15.)

The court addressed the issue a final time during Barrera's testimony.
Defense counsel argued Exhibit 10 was irrelevant because it had "nothing to do
with Carlos or an attitude about Carlos" and Exhibit 11 was similarly irrelevant
due to its lack of any "reference to Carlos." (Trial Tr., p.729, L.19 - p.730, L.5.)
Defense counsel further argued, with respect to Exhibit 11, the text message
was prejudicial, "not admissible under that rule of evidence which prohibits
inappropriate character attack," "violative of the character prohibitions," and "not
indicative of a trait for violence" or "of animosity with Carlos." (Trial Tr., p.729,
L.25 - p.730, L.21.)
The court allowed the admission of the evidence, reasoning:
So we have Mr. Barrera, who has now testified. He testified on
direct examination that there were text messages to Scarlet
Ramirez. The state's entitled to cross-examine him on those text
messages.
He has testified that, you know, he's there with
[Margery] Jacobsen. He's bothered by the fact that something
happened. He wasn't going to be able to hang out with Margery
Jacobsen . . . and yet he's texting -- while he is still there with
Margery Jacobsen, and she's with him, he's texting Carlos
Ramirez' ex-wife and asking her if she wants to fuck.
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So it goes to his credibility. I mean, he's telling the jurors,
you know, I want to hang out with Margery, I want to be with her,
and at the same time he's texting somebody else. So there's some
-- there's a credibility issue there as well. And so the text to
Margery [sic] has a tendency to impeach, you know, his credibility.
From the state's point of view, the defendant's state of mind,
they also want to show by this that he -- in the text that he texted to
[Scarlet] was that he did have Carlos on his mind. I mean the
state's theory of the case is Mr. Barrera was the instigator, at least I
think so ....
So as this case has progressed, you know my initial ruling
was that I felt overruled any relevancy.
But as this case
progressed, then I find, you know, based on all the testimony I've
heard up to date, that Exhibits 10 and 11, I believe, become more
relevant. They're more relevant in terms of also corroboration of
[Carlos'] testimony about the relationship between the defendant
and his ex-wife.
So, now we're on cross-examination [of the defendant], and
I just think it's appropriate at this time to allow the state to go into it.
(Trial Tr., p.734, L.13 - p.735, L.25.)
On appeal, Barrera asserts the district court erred in admitting Exhibits 10
and 11, contending the exhibits were inadmissible character evidence under
I.R.E. 404(a)(1 ). Even assuming Barrera's generalized references to the
"character zone," a "character attack" and "character prohibitions" constitute an
adequate objection for purposes of preserving his I.R.E. 404(a)(1) argument, he
has failed to show error in the admission of Exhibits 10 and 11 on this basis
because the district court did not allow admission of the evidence for purposes of
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proving character (nor did the state seek to admit the evidence on this basis\
Instead, the district court ruled the messages were admissible for purposes of
impeachment, to show Barrera's state of mind in relation to Carlos, and to
corroborate Carlos' testimony.

Barrera ultimately acknowledges as much and

argues "assuming it was not character evidence prohibited under 404(a)(1 ), the
evidence was not relevant for any of the reasons stated by the district court."
(Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Barrera is incorrect.
With respect to the court's ruling that the evidence was relevant for
impeachment and to corroborate Carlos' testimony, Barrera complains that
corroboration was unnecessary because the affair was undisputed and his
pursuit of "simultaneous sexual relationships with more than one person" was not
pertinent to his credibility absent any evidence that he "was misleading the
women about being in a monogamous relationship." (Appellant's Brief, pp.2021.)

Barrera's arguments in this regard fail because evidence impeaching or

corroborating a witness's testimony is always relevant.

See State v. Thumm,

153 Idaho 533, _ , 285 P.3d 348, 355 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting United States
v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)) ("Generally, 'Proof of bias is almost always
relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has

7

In fact, the prosecutor specifically stated otherwise: "I'm not offering these
texts to show that he's a womanizer. I don't think he was trying to have sex with
Scarlet Ramirez that night. I, certainly, wouldn't argue that; that's not the
purpose. The purpose is to show that he has Carlos on his mind, and he's the
one that persists. He keeps after it. He blames Carlos for what happened, but
nobody's texting him." (Trial Tr., p.732, L.24 - p.733, L.6.)
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historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy
and truth of a witness' testimony."').
Even if this Court disagrees with the district court's determination that
Exhibits

10 and

11

were relevant for purposes of impeachment and

corroboration, Barrera has offered no argument to support his claim that the
district erred in concluding the evidence was relevant to Barrera's state of mind
toward Carlos. Rather, Barrera argues, in conclusory fashion, that the "evidence
was not relevant for any of the reasons stated by the district court." (Appellant's
Brief, p.20.) And, with respect to the specific reasoning related to Barrera's state
of mind, Barrera only argues, "even assuming that the two messages were
relevant in that regard, their value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice."

(Appellant's Brief, p.22.)

Because Barrera has failed to

present any argument to support his claim that the court's state of mind
relevance ruling was incorrect, the Court should not consider that particular
claim. 8 State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (holding
that a party waives an issue on appeal if argument or authority is lacking).
Barrera's prejudice argument also fails.

"A lower court's determination

under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an
abuse of discretion."
omitted).

Thumm, 153 Idaho at _ , 285 P.3d at 355 (citations

The district court properly balanced the relevance of Barrera's text

8

The state also submits the district court's admission of the text messages to
show Barrera's state of mind was correct. Even Barrera acknowledged in his
trial testimony that his text messages to Scarlet were, "[t]o a certain point in
time," "pertinent to what was going on in [his] brain" (Trial Tr., p.727, Ls.16-19)
and agreed that he had "Carlos on the brain" (Trial Tr., p.728, Ls.14-16).
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messages in light of the evidence presented at trial and determined the probative
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. (Trial Tr., p. 734, L.13 - p. 735, L.25.) That Barrera disagrees with the
court's assessment does not establish an abuse of discretion.
Even if the Court finds error in the admission of Exhibits 10 and/or 11, any
error was harmless. An error "will be deemed harmless if the appellate court is
able to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable
possibility that the event complained of contributed to the conviction." Thumm,
153 Idaho at _ , 285 P.3d at 352 (citation omitted).

This Court can easily

conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Exhibits 10 and 11 did not contribute
to Barrera's conviction for aggravated assault.
At the end of the day, the question for the jury was whether Barrera
intentionally head-butted Carlos and whether Barrera acted in self-defense.
(See R., pp.13-15 (self-defense instructions).)

The most damning evidence

against Barrera was his own testimony in which he acknowledged (1) striking
Carlos' head (although he claimed it was because he lost his balance) (Trial Tr.,
p.705, Ls.2-5); (2) he has referred to himself as the "alpha male" (Trial Tr., p.711,
L.16 - p.712, L.5); (3) that it would be "stupid for Carlos to challenge him to a fist
fight because, as noted in Exhibit 7, Carlos is "little" and Barrera is "huge,"
measuring 6'3" and weighing 230-240 pounds (Trial Tr., p.722, L.10 - p.723, L.5;
Exhibit 7). Also damning was the fact that Barrera previously told someone that
if "some dude ever got brave with him that he would just head-butt him" because
they would "never see it coming" and could not "defend against it." (Trial Tr.,
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p.756, Ls.16-19.) This is precisely what the evidence showed Barrera did not
long after he told Scarlet that Carlos "tried to get brave."

(Exhibit 6.)

This

evidence, coupled with Carlos' testimony about Barrera's actions, supports a
conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any error in the admission of
Exhibits 10 and 11 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

IV.
Barrera Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Excluding His Expert Testimony On Head-Butting

A.

Introduction
Barrera asserts the district court "erred when it concluded that the

testimony of a proffered defense expert was not relevant." (Appellant's Brief,
p.23.)

Barrera contends the "proffered testimony was relevant to a fact of

consequence," namely, "the types of head-butts that are likely to cause great
bodily harm and the types that are not likely to do so." (Appellant's Brief, pp.23,
26.) Barrera's claim fails. The district court properly exercised its discretion in
excluding Barrera's head-butting expert.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the

province of the trial court." Healy, 151 Idaho at 736, 264 P.3d at 77. "[A] trial
court's determination as to the admission of evidence at trial will only be reversed
where there has been an abuse of that discretion."
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C.

Barrera Has Failed To Show Error In The Exclusion Of His Head-Butting
Expert
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dan

Embree.

(R., pp.183-185.) The grounds for the state's motion were:

(1) Mr.

Embree "is not qualified to opine as to the mechanics, methods, ability of the
Defendant to execute and purpose of 'headbutting' as a physical attack or
defense technique;" (2) even if Mr. Embree qualified as an expert, his testimony
would not aid the trier of fact; and (3) Mr. Embree's testimony would "confuse the
issues." (R., p.184.) At the hearing on the state's motion, Barrera argued that
Embree's testimony was necessary to explain "what head-butting is," and how it
is "administered." (10/5/2011 Tr., p.38, Ls.4-6, 11-12.) Barrera also proffered
that Mr. Embree could explain "what striking is, what the target, various targets
can be, what its purpose is." (10/5/2011 Tr., p.38, Ls.16-19.) More specifically,
Barrera explained that Mr. Embree would testify that a head-butt "calculated to
produce great bodily harm" is "done by a four-step method," described as
"keeping the eyes open, stepping into the direction of the attack, bending at the
waist and neck and propelling yourself upward to strike with the back of the
head." (10/5/2011 Tr., p.39, Ls.5-17.) Barrera acknowledged that he would not
know how to administer a head-butt as described by Mr. Embree until Mr.
Embree "show[ed] [them] in the courtroom." (Trial Tr., p.44, L.25 - p.45, L.3.)
The court granted the state's motion to exclude Mr. Embree's testimony,
concluding Embree would not assist the tier of fact but would only serve to
"confuse them." (10/5/2011 Tr., p .. 50, Ls.4-8.) The court explained:
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Mr. [Embree's] expertise is in martial arts. This is not what
we had here. We have basically two lay people having a heated
argument and one of them gets hurt. The state's alleging that it
was a head-butt, but it was not. They're not alleging in the sense
of it was a martial arts type maneuver or what, and that's
something - and there is no evidence that I have that the
defendant understood at the time of this incident that - how to
head-butt in martial arts.
Like I said, I think that would be relevant if he was a martial
arts person who had taken training in that, then maybe it becomes
relevant, Mr. [Embree's], but I do not -- I do think that it would
simply confuse the jury.
(10/5/2011 Tr., p.50, Ls.8-22.)
Barrera asserts the district court erred in excluding Mr. Embree's
testimony and suggests the court's decision "appears to be based on its
misunderstanding of the nature of the proffered testimony" because "[n]othing in
defense counsel's offer of proof indicated that Mr. Embree's testimony would be
limited to head-butts that were only executed by those trained in martial arts."
(Appellant's Brief, p.26.)

According to Barrera, "Mr. Embree's testimony

concerning the types of head-butts that are likely to cause great bodily harm and
the types that are not likely to do so was central to the question of guilt in this
case." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.) Barrera is incorrect and it is his argument that
appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the nature of Mr. Embree's
testimony.
Mr. Embree's proffered testimony was not for the purpose of explaining
the types of head-butts that are or are not likely to cause great bodily harm.
Indeed, it is unclear what qualifications Mr. Embree has to offer such an opinion.
Rather, Mr. Embree's testimony was for the purpose of explaining "what a head-
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butt is" and how it is "administered" according to Mr. Embree's self-defense
training technique. (10/5/2011 Tr., p.38, Ls.4-6, p.39, Ls.5-14; see R., p.189 (Mr.
Embree's explanation of how to administer a head-butt in self-defense and the
circumstances under which a head-butt should be delivered).) That Mr. Embree
teaches people to head-butt others in a manner that, at least according to
Barrera, is "calculated to produce great bodily injury" (Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.15-17),
does not mean that all head-butts performed any other way do not or cannot
produce great bodily injury.

Again, there is no indication that Mr. Embree, a

martial arts expert, would be qualified to render such an opinion regarding the
potential medical consequences of various kinds of head-butting techniques.
The question for the jury was not whether the particular head-butting "technique"
used by Barrera (though he denied head-butting at all) was "calculated to
produce great bodily injury"; the question was whether Barrera "committed the
assault by a means or force likely to produce great bodily harm." (R., p.292.)
Contrary to Barrera's claim, Mr. Embree's testimony did not address this
question.

As such, he has failed to establish the district court abused its
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discretion in excluding Mr. Embree's testimony. 9
Even if this Court finds the district court erred in excluding Mr. Embree's
testimony, the error is harmless. Part of Barrera's argument that the exclusion
was erroneous is premised on the assertion that Mr. Embree's testimony "was a
natural counterpoint to Dr. Barnes' testimony on the same issue." (Appellant's
Brief, p.27.) However, the "counterpoint" to Dr. Barnes' testimony was presented
through a different defense expert - Dr. Gerald Carlson. Dr. Carlson, who had
experience as a ringside physician for boxers, testified "if I were standing right in
front of you and would head-butt you, you might break your nose, you might get
a laceration, you could get a tooth knocked out, okay, but you would not have a
serious, serious injury." (Trial Tr., p.633, Ls.8-12.) Dr. Carlson also testified that
lacerations above the eye are "tearing-type injury" that can be caused by a force
that is "indirect and sliding." (Trial Tr., p.628, L.21 - p.631, L.8.) In light of Dr.

Barrera also contends his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense was
violated as a result of the exclusion of Mr. Embree's testimony. (Appellant's
Brief, p.27.) While a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a
defense, which "includes the right to offer testimony of witnesses, compel their
attendance, and to present the defendant's version of the facts to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies," this right does not allow the Court to ignore the
rules of evidence. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058
(2009). To the contrary, "[t]he Rules of Evidence embody the balancing test
which safeguards a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense along
with protection of the state's interest in the integrity of the criminal trial process."
~ at 240, 220 P.3d at 1059. Thus, if evidence is deemed inadmissible under
the applicable rules, the constitutional right to present a defense does not
override exclusion of the evidence. ~; see State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713,
_ , 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679
(1986) (noting the defendant's failure to provide "any authority holding that the
exclusion of irrelevant evidence violates a defendant's right to confront the
witnesses against him").
9
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Carlson's testimony and the substantial evidence of Barrera's guilt, any error in
the exclusion of Mr. Embree's testimony was harmless.

V.
Cumulative Error

"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when
there is 'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be
harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v.
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, _ , 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and
alteration omitted). A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error
doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,
958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).

In addition, cumulative error analysis does not

include errors neither objected to nor found fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at
230, 245 P.3d at 982.
Because Barrera has failed to show any error, much less two or more
errors, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case.
VI.
Barrera Has Failed To Establish The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In
Closing Argument, Much Less That The Prosecutor's Rebuttal Argument
Amounted To Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Barrera argues that the prosecutor "committed misconduct, constituting

fundamental error in violation of his due process right to a fair trial, when she
insulted the function of defense counsel during closing argument." (Appellant's
Brief, p.28.)

Barrera has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the
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prosecutor's remarks during closing argument, to which he did not object,
amount to error, much less fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"When prosecutorial misconduct is not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate

courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the
violation in question qualifies as fundamental error." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227,
245 P.3d at 979.

"Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the

defendant bears the burden of persua[sion]."

I.st

The first prong requires the

defendant show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights."

I.st

Second, the defendant must show the error

"plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision)."

I.st

Third, the defendant must show the error was "not

harmless." Id.

C.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct During Closing Argument
During her opening statement, the prosecutor commented:

"As they

remember leaving Chronic Taco, Carlos was so angry and disoriented that he
walked in the wrong direction."

(Trial Tr., p.193, Ls.8-10.)

Defense counsel

referred back to this comment during his closing argument, stating:
You heard the prosecutor, in her opening statement, promise you
disorientation, that [Carlos] Ramirez was disoriented that night. I've
explained to you my empathy for him. I've explained to you that I
understand his hurt, but I had no idea exactly what the promise of
the prosecutor meant when she said he was disoriented. Let's
summarize.
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Carlos was disoriented when he claimed he never saw
Benson in Grainey's. Why not admit it? Why be disoriented about
that? Does anyone hearing the testimony find reason to believe
that [Carlos] Ramirez pocket-dialed his telephone to Scarlet's
number four minutes after [Barrera] called to report, inappropriately
in text and language, that interaction between the two of them?
Was Mr. Carlos Ramirez disoriented when he told you that
he never texted Scarlet at 1:26, as Exhibit O shows you he did, or
at 1:45, which Exhibit O shows you he did ....
Carlos is disoriented when he tells you, collecting and
contrasting the evidence, that he did not start the verbal encounter
in Chronic Taco ....
. . . [Carlos] Ramirez said that he was ready to fight inside Chronic
Taco. "I'm right here. I'm right here." If he is such a small fellow
and such an inoffensive human being who would be victimized by a
much larger man, was he disoriented at those moments when he
admits to you that he was ready to fight. Eager to fight. We don't
have to go outside. We don't have to go around the block. I don't
have to forget where my car is, let's fight here. Obviously, he was
disoriented about his size and physical capacity.
And was he disoriented when he told you that not only did
my client challenge him to fight, my client got up and headed to the
door....
(Trial Tr., p.810, L.15- p.812, L.18.)
Defense

counsel

continued

highlighting

perceived

flaws

in

or

disagreements with Carlos' testimony, using some variation of the word
"disoriented" at least 25 more times. (Trial Tr., pp.813-817.) Defense counsel
summarized:
And all of these observations, I would suggest to you,
confirm that [Carlos] Ramirez was disoriented when he testified
here - perhaps that night - in ways that I've specified. And that if
you find from those 16 or 17 points of disorientation that [Carlos]
Ramirez was, indeed, not his best self, I would suggest to you that
it also is a disorientation for [Carlos] Ramirez to claim that Benson
Barrera intentionally head-butted him.
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(Trial Tr., p.817, Ls.14-21.)
The prosecutor opened her rebuttal argument with the following:

"After

defense counsel's remarks to you, my concern is that you are going to be
disoriented. That you are going to be confused, because that's part of his job,
about what you're supposed to do here."

(Trial Tr., p.818, Ls.11-15.)

The

prosecutor went on to explain that the jury was not tasked with deciding the
factual discrepancies such as "who yelled at who in Chronic Taco" or "whether
Benson Barrera ran into Carlos in Grainey's," which were the focus of defense
counsel's arguments regarding Carlos' "16 or 17 points of disorientation." (Trial
Tr., p.818, L.15 - p.819, L.8.) Barrera did not object to any of the prosecutor's
comments. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.818-825.)
Instead, for the first time on appeal, Barrera complains that the following
comment violated his right a fair trial: "After defense counsel's remarks to you,
my concern is that you are going to be disoriented. That you are going to be
confused, because that's part of his job, about what you're supposed to do here."
(Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Barrera contends the comment was improper because,
he claims, it "insulted the function of defense counsel." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.)
Barrera has failed to meet his burden of establishing any part of the three-prong
test for fundamental error.
Barrera's claim fails on the first prong because the prosecutor's comment
was not a personal attack or a disparagement of defense counsel.

It is not

insulting for a prosecutor to redirect a jury's focus back to the elements of the
offense the state is required to prove.
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That the prosecutor used the word

"disoriented," or even "confused," makes sense in light of defense counsel's
focus on the "disorientations" of Carlos. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,
179 (1986) ("[t]he prosecutors' comments must be evaluated in light of the
defense argument that preceded it"); Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at
440 (a prosecutor's comments "must be evaluated in light of defense conduct
and in the context of the entire trial").

Suggesting that confusion was part of

defense counsel's "job" was also not offensive.

Quite the opposite, creating

"confusion," i.e., reasonable doubt, is good advocacy and there is nothing
insulting about suggesting as much.
Barrera's claim also fails on prong two of the fundamental error analysis.
It is difficult to imagine a more "tactical," personal decision than ascertaining
whether something opposing counsel said was disparaging or offensive toward
you.

Defense counsel in this case was a former prosecutor and Attorney

General for this state (10/5/2011 Tr., p.49, Ls.3-5 (counsel highlighting during a
pretrial hearing his prior service as a prosecutor and the "attorney general
supervising 44 prosecutors")), who certainly had the knowledge and wherewithal
to decide for himself whether the prosecutor's statement was disparaging and
objectionable. Yet, he did not object. The state submits that defense counsel
failed to do so because, contrary to appellate counsel's assessment, the
prosecutor's comment was not expressed in such a manner as to disparage
defense counsel.
Finally, Barrera's prosecutorial misconduct claim fails on the third
fundamental error prong

"[A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned
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on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or
conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined
whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial."
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
Supreme Court:

United

As explained by the United States

"[l]t is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were

undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant question is whether
the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in
cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the
culpability of the prosecutor.") State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,451,816 P.2d
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991) (the function of appellate review is "not to discipline
the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not
interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial"). Even if improper, there is no
reasonable probability that the prosecutor's comment "affected the outcome of
the trial proceedings." Perry at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted).
Given the strength of the evidence of Barrera's guilt outlined above, the
court's instruction that the "arguments and statements of the attorneys are not
evidence" (R., p.302), and the relevant legal standards, which require Barrera to
show his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by two sentences in the prosecutor's
rebuttal argument, Barrera's claim fails under prong three of the fundamental
error test.

The fact that Barrera was also a criminal defense attorney

36

(Appellant's Brief, p.30), a point he highlighted at the outset of his testimony
(Trial Tr., p.663, Ls.3-8), does not change the weight of the evidence, the court's
instruction, or the applicable legal standard.
Barrera failed to establish fundamental error entitling him to appellate
review of his prosecutorial misconduct claim.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Barrera guilty of aggravated assault.
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